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The Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) initially pays below market prices for grain and then
reimburses producers later using a lump-sum transfer payment. We found empirically
that this mechanism serves as credible threat to any competitor challenging the CWB’s
long run leadership status in the international durum market.
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Backward Implicit Contracts, Pre-commitment and Market Power in the International
Durum Wheat Market
For several decades, the behavior and role of nationally sanctioned grain
marketing agents has been the focus of appreciable policy debate, the center of numerous
trade disputes, and the subject of considerable economic analysis.  The largest of these
agencies, and perhaps the most prominent, is the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB), which
controls marketing activities for Canada’s hard wheat, durum wheat and barley exports.
Many economists have suggested that the activities of national marketing agents are
noncompetitive.  McCalla (1966) was among the first to argue that the CWB acts as a
price leader in the international wheat export market.  Subsequently, Alouze Watson and
Sturges (1978) provide evidence of a noncompetitive wheat export triopoly between the
U.S., Canada, and Australia where, once again, the CWB was positioned as the price
leader.  Although other studies generate somewhat different conclusions about market
power in CWB influenced markets (e.g., Sarris and Freebairn, Love and Murniningtyas,
Paarlberg and Abbott,  Thursby and Thursby), a vast literature has emerged to support
the case of leadership positioning by the CWB.  In international barley markets, Schmitz
and Koo conclude that Canada and Australia act as dominant suppliers with other
exporters behaving as a fringe.
1  Goodwin and Smith demonstrate that the CWB operates
as the wheat export price leader and find that the board uses price discrimination between
national and international markets to maximized export revenue.  Smith and Holt
examined U.S.-Canada wheat price dynamics and found that Canadian price volatility
was five times more influential on U.S. prices than U.S. price volatility had on the
variance of Canadian wheat prices.  Using simulations, they predict that a Canadian price2
increase tends to be fully matched by U.S. firms in the long run, while only about 43% of
a U.S. price increase would be matched by Canada.  The conclusions of these recent
quantitative studies generally support the earlier models suggest that the CWB acts as the
market leader in world wheat markets.
Despite the long and scrutinized history of the CWB, a clear, consistent argument
has not been forwarded to explain the mechanism through which the CWB maintains a
long-run leadership status.  In the present paper, a formal test for Stackelberg leadership
behavior is derived that relies on a critical and heretofore unrecognized feature that
distinguishes the CWB from other marketing agents in the U.S. and the E.U.
Specifically, the CWB pays Canadian farmers a below-market upstream price for grain
then reimburses farmers with proceeds from downstream international grain sales.  This
payment system represents an implicit form of an export subsidy, which generates a
marginal cost advantage for the CWB in the international market and subsequent
leadership status (Brander and Spencer).
The model is applied to the durum wheat export market, in which Canada has
typically maintained a 40-60% export market share (International Wheat Council).
Unlike hard wheat and barley markets, the CWB does not compete with the AWB in
durum wheat markets, and only limited substitution is possible for durum wheat in
semolina flour and pasta formulas.  These features provide the clearest approach to
evaluate the prepayment system of the CWB as a mechanism to acquire leadership.
As in a standard model of strategic trade, the international equilibrium is
determined as the outcome of a simultaneous-move game, while Stackelberg leadership is
                                                                                                                                                                    
1 The Australian Wheat Board (AWB) controls and exports domestic hard wheat and barley markets in a
manner similar to that of the CWB.3
derived from previous price-commitment in the procurement market.  That is, the CWB
chooses implicitly its own marginal cost by setting the upstream transfer price of durum
wheat at the farm gate.  With sufficient market information, the CWB can identify the
optimal procurement markdown to attain leadership status in the international market.
Our empirical analysis employs estimates of the international market conditions to derive
a confidence interval about the optimal procurement markdown and tests the hypothesis
that CWB discounts can be used to acquire a leadership position.
The Model
The model presented here follows the more general framework developed by Hamilton
and Stiegert.  We consider a vertical structure comprised of two markets: an upstream
market, in which farmers sell durum wheat to marketing agents in isolated domestic
markets and a downstream market, in which marketing agents sell durum wheat to
consumers in a single international market.  In the Canadian upstream market, the CWB
sets the upstream market price in a procurement contract for raw durum wheat.  The
CWB’s trade competitors, by contrast, face legal challenge in the explicit control of
upstream market prices.  In the U.S., for example, Perloff, Rubinfeld and Ruud (1996)
identify 13 major antitrust categories, several of which limit the ability of domestic
marketing agents to control the pricing behavior of durum wheat suppliers.
Consider for analytic convenience the case in which farmers in the U.S., E.U., and
Canada produce durum wheat at a constant marginal cost of c.
2  The durum wheat
purchased by the marketing agents for the export market is then sold in an international
market comprised of the CWB and an independent group of rival firms.
                                                       
2 Extension of the model to consider more general supply relationships is relatively straightforward.  In the
empirical model to follow, the results are quite robust to considerations of upward sloping supply relations.4
Strategic interaction between the marketing agents is modeled as a three-stage
game.  In the first stage, the contract stage, the CWB writes an observable and non-
renegotiable contract with Canadian farmers.  The contract specifies the upstream (or
wholesale) price of durum wheat, w, and a fixed transfer F to be paid from proceeds
collected in the downstream international market.  In the second stage, the acceptance
stage, Canadian farmers either accept or reject the contract.
3  In the third and final stage,
the CWB and rival marketing agents compete in quantities in an international oligopoly.
Throughout, we confine attention to the case in which marketing agents in the
U.S. and E.U. operate under the auspices of antitrust authorities that do not allow the
formation of procurement contracts in the upstream raw durum market.  That is, the
independent marketing agents are constrained to purchase inputs in the spot market at
marginal cost c.  In the remainder of this section, we refer to other marketing agents in
the U.S. and E.U. as other exporters (OE).
Let Q represent total output of the final good and denote the downstream inverse
demand function as P(Q), which is assumed throughout to be strictly decreasing and
twice continuously differentiable.  Furthermore, it is assumed that
PQ Q P Q '( ) ''( ) +< 0, (1)
which, as demonstrated by Novshek (1985), ensures the existence of equilibrium.
The model is solved using backward induction.  Accordingly the output stage is
solved first, followed by the acceptance and contract stages, respectively.  Given that the
                                                       
3 In this stylized model, Canadian farmers are given the choice of whether or not to accept the CWB
contract.  In reality, participation in the CWB contract is mandatory; however, it is important for modeling
reasons to consider an acceptance stage, albeit a degenerate one, to ensure that Canadian farmers are not
made worse off by participating in the CWB selling system.  That is, if a “participation constraint” is not
met, in which each Canadian farmer is (at least weakly) better off through the actions of the CWB, then it is
difficult to explain the persistence of the CWB as a viable national marketing channel.5
contractual relationship is satisfactory to Canadian farmers in the acceptance stage, the
objective function of the CWB in the output stage is
() () p CC C qQ w F P Q w q F ,,, () =- - ,( 2 )
where  pC and qC denote the level of profit and output for the CWB, respectively.
Maximization of (2) with respect to qC yields the first-order necessary condition:
PQ qP Q w C () ' () +- = 0. (3)
In the OE downstream markets for durum wheat, let qUi  represent the output of
an individual OE marketing agent i.  Then, if n denotes the number of OE marketing





.   For marketing agent i,
the objective function in the output stage is
() p UU U ii i qQ P Q c q (, ) ( ) =- ,
which yields the first-order condition
PQ q P Q c UU ii () ' () +- = d 0, (4)
where  dUU ii dQ dq =  is the conjectural variations parameter of OE marketing agent i in
the output market.  The output stage equilibrium in the international durum wheat market
is completely characterized by simultaneously solving the n+1 equations in (3) and (4).
To achieve greater analytic tractability, the remainder of the paper confines
attention to the case of symmetric OE marketing agents, qn q UU i = (/) 1 , and symmetric
market conjectures in the downstream international market, dd U i = .  For the symmetric
case, the above system of equations may be simplified considerably by aggregating the n6
first-order conditions (4), which yields the first-order condition for a representative firm
  PQ q P Q c U () ' () +- = l 0. (5)
where ld =Î /[ , ] n 01 , with 0 representing competition and 1 representing monopoly.
The export volume of durum wheat for the U.S. and Canada and the level of total
international output, denoted qw c i U C i (,) , ,   =  and Qwc ( , )  respectively, are obtained by
solving (3) and (5) simultaneously.  Totally differentiating these equations yield the ratio
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which is negative given stability condition (1).
In the acceptance stage, Canadian farmers accept the contract proposed by the
CWB provided they receive a payment no less than the opportunity costs of producing
durum wheat.  Given that Canadian farmers are competitive, these opportunity costs can
be normalized to zero without loss of generality.  As a result, Canadian farmers accept
the contract whenever the following participation constraint is satisfied
() ( , ) wc qw c F C -+ ³ 0, (7)
where  F is the aggregate fixed transfer payment paid to Canadian farmers with
international durum wheat revenues.
In the contract stage, the CWB chooses the contract terms to maximize profits in
(2) subject to the participation constraint (7) and the output stage solutions above.
Substituting the output stage solutions into (2) and (7), the contracting problem becomes:
() Max w F P Q w c w q w c F
wF CC , (,) ((,) ) (,) p =- -
s.t () ( , ) wc qw c F C -+ ³ 0.7
Substitution of the constraint results in the following unconstrained problem:
() Max w P Q w c c q w c
w CC p () ( (,) ) (,) =- .( 8 )
Suppressing some of the output stage solution notation, differentiation of (8) with respect
to w gives the necessary condition for a profit-maximizing contract,

















Manipulating (9), if qU
*  and Q
* represent the equilibrium levels of OE output and total
industry output, respectively, then the CWB’s equilibrium output level, qC
*, satisfies


































=  denotes the ratio of comparative statics given in (6).
Using expression (5), the equilibrium level of durum wheat output by the OE satisfies
PQ c q P Q U (* ) *' (* ) -+ = l 0. (11)
The equilibrium levels of output for the CWB and for OE marketing agents are thus
obtained by substituting Q
*=qC
*+qU
* into (10) and (11) and solving simultaneously.
To determine the optimal contract price for raw durum wheat, denoted w
*,











where the inequality holds by (1) and (6).  Thus, the profit-maximizing contract set by the
CWB specifies that farmers sell durum wheat at a loss.  The CWB compensates farmers
later through the payment of a fixed transfer, F, that satisfies the participation constraint
(7).  Thus, it is optimal for the CWB to use contractual relations with upstream farmers to8
achieve an output expansion in the final goods market by restructuring production costs
between fixed and marginal cost components.  The optimal upstream price to be specified
in the contract (12) stipulates below-marginal cost prices for raw Canadian durum wheat,
which pre-commits the CWB to an ex post beneficial output expansion.
An Empirical Test of Stackelberg Leadership Behavior
Suppose that the CWB is able to obtain a Stackelberg leadership role in the international
durum wheat market through the choice of the procurement price discount (12).  If this is
the case, the model above yields a testable implication.  In particular, suppose that
international demand for durum wheat is specified by the isoelastic demand
equation PQ = a
e 1/ , where e is the price elasticity of demand.  Making use of the fact that
QP P ' = 1 e  and QP P '' ' ( ) =- 1 ee  and substituting (6) into (12), the optimal
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w c M , (13)
where SC * is the market share of the CWB in the international durum wheat equilibrium
and  () Sq q UU U
i
n
i * = å
= 1
 is the sum of market shares of the individual marketing agents in
other exporting nations (i.e., the OE share of the export market).  For a given value of the
demand elasticity, expression (13) yields a direct implication for leadership behavior.
To test the null hypothesis of Stackelberg procurement pricing, we proceed in two
stages.  First, the long-run export market demand elasticity and the conjectural variation
parameter are estimated using the Bresnahan framework (see Deodhar and Sheldon).
Using the parameter estimates and standard errors from the empirical model, a
confidence interval is then established for the optimal procurement markdown, which is9
used to test the null hypothesis that the observed markdown coincides with the
Stackelberg leadership markdown in (13).
The export demand equation used for this study is specified as:
QL Q P P P Z DD R =+ + + + + aa a a a e 01 2 3 4 1 (14)
where Q is total world exports of durum wheat, LQ is exports lagged one period, PD is
Minneapolis real price of durum wheat, PDPR is the product of the real price of rice, PR,
and the real Minneapolis durum price, and Z1 is the per capita income in all nations other
than the U.S. and Canada.  The price interaction term, PDPR, is used to generate the
standard demand rotation necessary to identify the market power parameter.
The marginal cost of durum exports, PD, is determined simultaneously with
demand in (14) and uniquely identifies the conjectural variation, or market power,

















22 3  (15)
where, and Z2 is a real price index for electricity, and T is a time trend.
Results
The above system was estimated using nonlinear three-stage least squares with
annual crop year data from 1971 through 1994.  The results appear in Table 1.  Most of
the parameter estimates are statistically significant and of the expected sign.  The
parameter associated with lagged quantity is in the theoretically prescribed range and
indicates a reasonably quick adjustment process to short-term changes.  The coefficient
on own price demand is negative and highly significant.  The short run mean demand
elasticity was estimated at -0.812 and which adjusts to a long run [-0.812/(1-.24997)]10
value of –1.08.  The market interaction term is significant and indicates that rice is a
substitute for durum wheat.  The coefficient on world per capita income is positive and
significant, which indicates that durum wheat is a normal good.  The market power term
is significant, indicating that the world durum market is, in fact, noncompetitive.
Table 2 compares the optimal and observed markdown prices by the CWB.  The
first column of Table 2 presents the optimal markdown price from (13) given the long-
run demand elasticity estimate and the estimate of market power.  The second column
presents the observed markdown by the CWB, which is taken as the difference between
the initial procurement price and final payments made to producers.  The observations
within a 95% confidence interval of the optimal M* are signified with a †-symbol in the
third column.  For nine of the 25 years, we fail to reject of the hypothesis that the CWB
used the prepayment mechanism to generate Stackelberg leadership.  In three of these
years (1972, 1973 and 1987), we find that the CWB exceeded the optimal markdown.  In
an average year, the CWB procures durum wheat with about half of the markdown that is
sufficient to achieve Stackelberg leadership.
Although the results do not fully support the theoretical model in every year, there
is considerable evidence that the pre-payment mechanism has been used to force other
exporters to accept long-run follower status.  To challenge the leadership position of the
CWB would require a competing nation to have a similar long-run stable institutional
feature.  Given the ebb and flow of grain export policies in other nations, such
institutional advantages have simply not been available.  Thus, the flexibility of the CWB
to fully utilize its pre-commitment tool is likely to be a sufficient deterrent to discipline
other players in the market into a follower role without large procurement discounts.  The11
findings presented here do not dilute the notions that the CWB uses product
differentiation and price discrimination tactics to increase market share.  In fact, our
conclusions rationalize such behavior.  With a stable leadership role, a large market
share, and economic profits that meet the participation constraint in (7), the CWB is more
able to focus attention on improving crop quality and building customer networks that
allow for price discrimination practices.  Finally, the rational for the prepayment system
employed in Canada motivated by reasons other than market control (i.e. budgetary
concerns and/or cash flow constraints.)  Nevertheless, once instituted, the pre-
commitment mechanism would certainly not be underutilized by the CWB.
Conclusions
The purpose of this paper was to evaluate an important yet largely unrecognized
strategic component of the Canadian grain marketing system.  Specifically, we examined
the strategic impacts of the CWB’s practice of initially paying below market prices for
grain and then reimbursing producers later using a lump-sum transfer payment.  Our
theory suggests the optimal markdown generates a strategic advantage leading to
Stackelberg leadership status for the CWB. The empirical results for international durum
markets indicated 9 of the 25 observed markdowns were not significantly different from
the markdown required to generate leadership status. Therefore, it is reasonable to
conclude that this mechanism serves as credible threat to any competitor that considers
challenging the CWB’s long run leadership status.   The results also indicated that this
institutional feature is an important reason explaining why the CWB has been able to
exert and maintain its leadership status over the past 30 years.12
Table 1:  Model estimates for Durum Export Demand 1971-1994.
Parameter Estimate Standard Error
a0        (intercept)  0.94325 20.815
a1        (LQ)  0.24997** 0.1933
a2        (PD) -4.71* 1.807
a3        (PD*PR) 2124.6* 944.2
a4        (Z1) 6.33* 2.441
b0         (intercept) 14.35* 7.329
b1         (Q) -0.34* 0.097
l          (Market Power) -.449** 0.267
b2         (Z2) -1.58 5.75
b3         (T) 0.188 0.169
Short-Run Demand Elasticity -0.812
Long-Run Demand Elasticity -1.083
R
2 .71
    * denotes significance at the 90% level.  ** denotes significance at the 85% level.
Table 2:  Stackelberg Markdown Versus Observed Markdowns by the






1971 22.23 2.31 10.3
1972 28.117 41.89 147.2
†
1973 78.91 87.85 110.3
†
1974 81.23 73.89 89.8
†
1975 56.66 18.3 31.9
1976 39.01 30.5 77.2
†
1977 43.34 18.1 41.2
1978 39.61 20.24 50.5
1979 49.28 39.5 79.3
†
1980 91.58 0.58 0
1981 60.87 25.84 41.9
1982 73.96 10.74 14.3
1983 80.43 21.83 26.7
1984 69.68 22.64 32.07
1985 43.72 19.09 43.2
1986 33.73 18.2 53.3
†
1987 38.51 42.21 109.6
†
1988 47.18 12.06 25.3
1989 50.49 11.47 22.4
1990 46.02 0 0
1991 38.10 35.37 91.8
†
1992 39.83 36.61 90.9
†
1993 81.99 45.38 54.6
1994 95.57 50.55 52.2
1995 104.95 24.55 23.4
AVG 75-84 58.92 29.58 53.8
AVG 85-95 57.05 26.86 51.413
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